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Abstract
We analyze an optimal control version of a simple SIRS epidemiology model. The policy
maker can adopt policies to diminish the contact rate between infected and susceptible
individuals, at a specific economic cost. The arrival of a vaccine will immediately end
the epidemic. Total or partial immunity is modeled, while the contact rate can exhibit
a (user specified) seasonality. The problem is solved in a spreadsheet environment. A
reasonable parameter selection leads to optimal policies which are similar to those followed
by different countries. A mild response relying on eventually reaching a high immunity
level is optimal if ample health facilities are available. On the other hand limited health
care facilities lead to strict lock downs while moderate ones allow a flattening of the curve
approach.
1 Introduction
The balance between measures to reduce the spread of a virus and the desire to retain
social and economic activity to a reasonable level is quite delicate, as evidenced by the
bitter debate among policy makers, political parties and nations defending their own
attitudes while vilifying those of others. The tradeoffs can be assessed by using a control
methodology, as in [1], where a lock-down intervention is incorporated in a SIR model,
including the probabilistic occurrence of a vaccine, [9] where properties of the optimal
policy are proven, [5] which employs this methodology to assess the combination of several
modes of intervention, while [10] incorporates an SIR model without extensive use of
optimal control methodology.
We are interested to study policy related questions using optimization methods and
in particular to clarify the conditions under which a relaxed policy is optimal versus a
more restrictive one. We are in the midst of a crisis and several questions have been only
partially answered by authorities in the Northern Hemisphere concerning:
1. To what extent will the lock-down be relaxed during the summer months?
2. Will the epidemic flare up again in the winter?
3. Since extensive immunity has not been achieved in most countries will the interven-
tion be more (less) intensive in the Fall?
Our analysis shows that the policies followed by the authorities can be correct for the
appropriate combination of epidemiological and economic parameters. It is of interest to
see whether the policies derived in our simple model appear in more complex deterministic
or stochastic models. Needless to say an accurate parameter estimation as well as state
identification is of paramount importance for policy implementation. Policy making under
imperfect information is beyond the scope of this work.
2 Model Formulation
We consider the standard SIRS epidemiological model (without vital dynamics ) of W. O.
Kermack and A. G. McKendrick [8], [11] endowed with the potential for controlling the
contact parameter. Thus let S(t), I(t), R(t) be the number of individuals in a population
of size N(t) that are Susceptible, Infectives and Removed at time t. We consider a short
horizon, assume a constant population N = N(t) and work with the corresponding frac-
tions s(t) = S(t)/N and v(t) = I(t)/N , the removed fraction being determined by s, v as
1− s(t)− v(t). For convenience we denoted the fraction of infectives by v instead of i.
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The dynamics of an epidemic assuming homogeneous mixing of the population are
determined by:
a. The rate of newly infected originating in the susceptibles is λ(t)s(t)v(t)
b. The rate of removal from the class of infectives is γv(t) and
c. The rate of immunity loss of those removed is δ(1− s(t)− v(t)) who then revert to
the susceptible class
In the above equations λ is the contact rate, which is the average number of adequate
contacts per infective and unit time [11], γ is the removal (recovery plus death) rate.
The case of a nonzero reinfection rate corresponding to immunity loss at rate δ can be
easily included in the model (and causes no numerical difficulties) so we are dealing with
a controlled form of the SIRS model. The standard epidemic dynamics are
ds
dt
= −λ(t)s(t)v(t) + δ(1− s(t)− v(t))
dv
dt
= λ(t)s(t)v(t)− γv(t). (1)
For the infectives to decrease it is necessary that s(t) < γ
λ
, the quantity γ
λ
being referred
to as the basic reproduction number Ro [11]. Equivalently one reports [2] the Effective Re-
production Number Re =
λs(t)
γ
which is desired to be less than one to control the epidemic.
Equilibria of (1) have been analyzed extensively [11] assuming no loss of immunity. More
detailed models in the same reference [11] include latent infectives (Exposed) who accel-
erate the contagion rate (SEIRS). We assume that this effect can be reflected by a proper
choice of the contact rate λ without drastically altering the optimal intervention policies.
We allow for the contact rate to depend on time, modeling thus seasonal variations in the
spread of viruses.
We assume that the mitigation, suppression and any other policies mentioned say
in [7] can be represented by a scalar control variable u(t) in [0, 1], as in [1]. This is
an oversimplification: one could study modes of intervention k = 1, .., n and consider a
vector control [u1, .., un] of intensities of the corresponding instrument as in [5]. However
all proposed interventions consist of reducing the contact rate λ so we expect to get some
insights from the scalar case. We thus model the effect of a level u intervention by the
expression
λ(t) = λo(t)(1− u(t)). (2)
The contact rate before the intervention is λo(t) and most likely has a seasonality. The
effectiveness of the intervention is assumed linear multiplicative, while [1] assumes a
quadratic effect λ(t) = λo(t)(1 − θu(t))2 with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 the effectiveness of the in-
tervention. This formulation assumes that the intervention is of the lockdown type and
hence there will be a reduction in both the number of infectives that are free to move
and the number of contacts each one has. We prefer to use a linear multiplicative effect
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which simplifies calculation while there little loss of generality since the two formulations
are functionally related.
At every time interval [t, t + ∆t] we assume a cost proportional to the fraction of
infectives. The cost will consist of the reduced output of those infected that exhibit
symptoms, the cost of medical service required (perhaps in addition a discomfort cost)
and finally a cost for fatalities. In [1] the dimensions of this cost are in economic terms,
and we will follow their estimates in our parameter selection. Thus we will have a cost
element m(t)v(t)∆t, the time dependence in the cost coefficient m(t) possibly reflecting
changes in treatment costs and effectiveness. We also include a cost element that reflects
the capacity of a health system as follows: let vo(t) be the level of infectives that causes
the heath system to reach its capacity; it can be time dependent reflecting capacity
additions. Then we add a smooth penalty cost element of the form v(t)× aeM(v(t)−vo)∆t.
The parameters a,M are selected so that the cost is small if the infectives do not stress
the system but rises steeply if they do. In contrast, [1] models this capacity problem by
assuming a cost quadratic in the fraction of infectives v; a non smooth penalty term of
the form M ·max[0, v − vo] with M large is introduced for the same purpose in [5].
The control intensity u is assumed to incur a convex cost, since simple mitigation
policies have small, sub linear costs, but suppression measures have costs that increase
super linearly. Thus we consider a control cost of the form Au(t)n∆t, usually quadratic
(n = 2) . We will follow again [1] in selecting parameters, although it does not include
a quadratic control cost. We could also incorporate a cost term reflecting weariness from
lengthy intervention, an important concern in policy making; this term could be a function
of the total effort up to that time, say of zt =
∫ t
0
u(s)ds. However the higher dimension of
such a model would make its numerical solution too involved for a preliminary analysis.
The prospective of finding an effective cure including a vaccine has been a major
concern in the planning of interventions. We assume that a complete cure will be available
at a time Thor at which the crisis ends and no further cost accrues, not even a terminal one.
It is straightforward to introduce such a cost depending on the final level of susceptibles
and infectives but it would again unduly complicate the numerical solution. The random
variable Thor has a known density g(Thor) assessed at the initial time t = 0 leading to a
tails distribution G(t) = Pr(Thor ≥ t) =
∫∞
t
g(s)ds t ≥ 0. We make the assumption that
this probability does not essentially change in time in the sense that if the crisis has not
ended by to then
Pr(Thor ≥ t | Thor ≥ to) = Pr(Thor ≥ t)/Pr(Thor ≥ to) t ≥ to. (3)
Under this assumption a policy that was proven optimal at time to remains so at any
future time t > to; it would be different if say failure of finding an effective treatment in
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reasonable time alters the remaining time estimate, that is if we had
Pr(Thor ≥ t | Thor ≥ to) = φ(t, to)
for some arbitrary function φ.
Assuming now that costs are additive in time and are to be discounted at a rate ρ the
total cost is given by the following random variable:∫ Thor
to
e−ρτ [v(τ) {m(τ) + aexp(M [v(τ)− vo])}+ Aun] dτ. (4)
If g is the density and G the tails distribution of the horizon, the expected value of the
random variable in (4) is∫ ∞
to
g(Thor)
∫ Thor
to
e−ρτ [v(τ) {m(τ) + aexp(M [v(τ)− vo])}+ Aun] dτdThor. (5)
We will assume that the cure will eventually be found so g(t) vanishes for t greater than
some value say Tmax. Then we can change the order of integration in (5) and write the
expected cost as
1
G(to)
∫ Tmax
to
e−ρτG(τ) [v(τ) {m(τ) + aexp(M [v(τ)− vo])}+ Aun] dτ. (6)
The constant term 1
G(to)
can be omitted and hence the optimal policy does not change as
the arrival of the cure is delayed.
As customary, we try to determine the policy u(t) that minimizes the expected value
of the cost (6) subject to the dynamics in (1), a standard optimal control problem. In
addition to minimizing expected value one could consider utility criteria that take into
account various statistics of the cost random variable, possibly a portfolio type problem
minimizing variance given a upper bound on the expected cost. These problems are more
complicated so we work with expected value minimization. Since our formulation is time
dependent we use the optimal control formalism [4]; a solution through the Hamilton
Jacobi Bellman equation used in [1] would have an additional time dimension and will be
difficult to solve. Therefore consider the Hamiltonian
H = e−ρτG(τ) [v(τ) {m(τ) + aexp(M [v(τ)− vo])}+ Aun] +
+φs [λo(t)(u(t)− 1)s(t)v(t) + δ(1− s(t)− v(t))] +
+φv [λo(t)(1− u(t))s(t)v(t)s(t)− γv(t)] .
(7)
The costate variables are φs, φv for states s, v respectively. The optimal policy is deter-
mined by choosing the value of u in [0, 1] minimizing the Hamiltonian (7). The Hamilto-
nian is convex in the control so we solve ∂H
∂u
= 0 for u∗,
u∗(t) =
[
eρt(φv − φs)λo(t)s(t)v(t)
nAG(t)
]1/(n−1)
(8)
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and obtain the optimal control by truncation:
uopt(t) =

1 u∗ ≥ 1
u∗ 0 ≤ u∗ ≤ 1
0 u∗ ≤ 0
(9)
The optimal intervention expression above shows from a policy perspective why it is
important to have a good estimates of the product of susceptibles and infectives. In
[9] properties of the optimal policy are derived for a constant underlying contact rate
λo(t) = λo and it would be of interest to extend their analysis to the case where we have
a seasonal variation in the rate.
The costate equations are
dφs
dt
= −∂H
∂s
= (φs − φv)λo(t)(1− u(t))v(t) + δφs
dφv
dt
= −∂H
∂v
= (φs − φv)λo(t)(1− u(t))s(t) + δφs + γφv−
− [m(t) + a(1 + v(t)M)exp(Mv(τ)− vo(t))] e−ρtG(t).
(10)
The optimal control is determined by solving a two point boundary value problem (TP-
BVP) consisting of the equations (1) and (10) with control as in (9). The boundary
conditions are the (a) at the initial time to we are given the values of the state variables
s(to) = so, v(to) = vo (b) at the final time Tmax it is the costate variables that must
vanish, φs(Tmax) = φv(Tmax) = 0.
Such TPBVP’s are notoriously difficult to solve numerically (a comprehensive de-
scription is in Ch. 7 of [4]) since the costate variables increase backward in time while the
state ones decrease, and indeed we encountered numerical instabilities. Our computations
used several methods described in the reference, usually starting with a variation of the
shooting method [6] that consists of selecting arbitrary starting values for φs(to), φv(to)
along with the given s(to), v(to) and solving the initial value problem to obtain the corre-
sponding final costate values φs(Tmax), φv(Tmax). We then adjust the initial costate values
until φs(Tmax), φv(Tmax) vanish. This is numerically difficult because small changes in
the initial costate values cause huge ones in the final ones [4]. The initial value problem
of the four differential equations (1) and (10) with conditions at to was solved by a sec-
ond order predictor corrector method [6] in a spreadsheet environment. We then used
the built in optimizer to adjust the initial costate variables so that the final ones vanish.
When this did not give satisfactory results (final values were far from zero) we adjusted
the initial values to minimize cost, which often decreased the policy cost but led to large
final costate values. In such cases we improved on the solution by the first order gradient
search for optimal control problems (Section 7.4 in [4]) which is also used in [5]. Usually
the improvement was slight and the derivative ∂H/∂u decreased slowly, so we mostly
report on the results of the shooting method. A detailed description of the numerical
methods used (and spreadsheets) is available upon email request.
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3 Parameter Selection
We select nominal values for the parameters informally, since these values only serve as
reference points around which we vary them to form scenaria. In turn these scenaria will
show the types of optimal intervention we might expect to see implemented. We will
select these nominal parameter values to be consistent with those stated in the literature
and then modify them in various scenaria.
To select epidemiological parameters we use mainly [1] and [7]. The contact rate we
use is potentially periodic of the form
λo(t) = λo(1 + kseassin(2pit)).
The time unit is one year, and the origin t = 0 is the Autumn Equinox. Thus in late
September the contact rate is λo but in the beginning of the winter it takes the value
λo(1 + kseas). The nominal value for the seasonality coefficient is set at 0.8, but we also
tested smaller nonzero values. The base contact rate λo is selected as in [7] to reflect a 20%
daily increase or (about) 70 year−1. The removal rate γ is taken as 1/18 days−1 or about
20 year−1. The mortality rate is taken as in [7] µ = 1%, so the number of infection caused
fatalities in an interval ∆t is µγNv(t)∆t. The fatality rate is age dependent and thus
models to be used for detailed policy making should include age related variables; here
we restrict ourselves to a homogeneous population. The fatality rate has been challenged
recently [3] since the infectives’ population was estimated to be quite higher than the one
used officially. We will study this variation in some scenaria.
To assess the economic impact of the infection we make the following assumptions: it
is stated in [7] that about 60% of the infected show some symptoms, the rest being asymp-
tomatic or unreported (we will not differentiate between the two). Of those exhibiting
symptoms (which appear on the average 5 days after infection) a fraction of 0.04 need
hospitalization, and 0.30 of the above require intensive care. We thus have four types of
infectives, those who show No Symptoms, those with Mild Symptoms, those with Severe
Symptoms and those with Extra Severe Symptoms. The types of health care are also of
four types, No Care, Home Care, Hospital Care and ICU Care. In Table 1 we (loosely) as-
sign fractions of infection time to care type for each infective type. As an example, those
who will show Severe Symptoms will spent 28% of their infection time asymptomatic,
28% in home care and 44% in a hospital. Thus a randomly selected infective will be
in a specific state of health care with a probability calculated in the above table by the
expression relating conditional to total probability, i.e.
Prob(CareType) =
∑
InfectiveType
Pr(CareType | InfectiveType)Pr(InfectiveType).
Thus the probability of being in Home Care is 0.577·0.50+.016·0.28+0.007·0.11 = 0.294.
This calculation is shown in the last row of Table 1.
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Table 1: Disease parameters
Infective type No symptoms Home Care Hospitalization Intensive Fraction
No symptoms 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.400
Mild Symptoms 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.577
Severe Symptoms 0.28 0.28 0.44 0.00 0.016
Extra Severe 0.17 0.11 0.39 0.33 0.007
Probability 0.694 0.294 0.010 0.002 1.00
We compute an economic cost of the infection consisting of production loss plus health
care costs as follows. In an interval of length ∆t those symptomatic will abstain from pro-
duction and will cause additional costs to the health system depending on the symptoms’
severity. We assume a homogeneous population of N individuals producing W units of a
single good yearly, thus lost production is (1 − 0.694)Nv(t)W
N
∆t = 0.306v(t)W∆t). We
assume that the daily cost of home treatment is half, hospital treatment is 5 times and
intensive care 20 daily production units. Then average treatment cost is the fractions of
care types derived earlier multiplied by the corresponding costs, namely
(0.294 · 0.5 + 0.010 · 5 + 0.002 · 20)v(t)W∆t.
Adding the cost of foregone production we obtain the expression
(0.306 + 0.294 · 0.5 + 0.010 · 5 + 0.002 · 20)v(t)W∆t = 0.543v(t)W∆t.
In the analysis of [1] the cost of fatalities is expressed in terms of production lost,
which is W
rN
if we assume individuals of infinite life, where r,N are the discount factor
and population respectively. The same analysis considers adding a lump sum χ as a
noneconomic loss of life cost, which however is taken as zero. Now, individuals do not
live forever and furthermore fatalities in this particular infection are mainly among older
individuals of lower life expectation so W
rN
is an overestimate. We thus use the same figures
as in [1], i.e. a cost 20W/N per fatality but which implies an additional noneconomic
fatality cost. Loss of life in ∆t is µγv(t)∆t so the fatality cost is 0.01 · 20 · 20v(t)∆t =
4v(t)∆t. This term is an order of magnitude greater than the production foregone and
health care costs, and so exact estimation of the latter is of minor importance. Naturally, a
revision of the fatality rate will greatly influence the total infection cost. In most scenaria
the coefficient of the infected fraction is taken as 5, but we also examine a value of 2.5,
reflecting a lower fatality rate as implied in [3].
The model incorporates a steep penalty term when the capacity of the health system
is exceeded consisting of adding the term aeM(v(t)−vo) to the infectives’ coefficient m, vo
being the infected fraction that drives the health system to its capacity. We select a to
be unity and M to be large, about 200, and we will verify the appropriateness of this
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choice. The critical level of infectives is selected taking into account that a fraction of
0.002 of those infected require intensive care (Table 1, last row) and the proportion of
ICU units are 10−4 in a typical western country (the case of Italy as recounted in [7]).
Thus setting 2 · 10−3vo = 10−4 we obtain vo = 5%. For zero infected the additional cost
coefficient is exp(−200 · 0.05) = 4.5 · 10−5 << 5; for v − vo = 2% the added coefficient
is exp(200 · 0.02) = 54.5 >> 5; for v = vo the addition to the nominal coefficient of 5
is 1, i.e. 20%, which reflects some stress on the health system. We will also consider
scenaria of added capacity to the health system by increasing vo as vo(t) = vo2
t, doubling
the capacity every year (one could consider a construction cost, but this would unduly
complicate a preliminary model).
The cost Aun, n > 1 is a convex function of the intervention level, which is reasonable
since first order results can be achieved without any production loss through warnings,
information dissemination etc. Suppression policies do have an economic cost, indeed a
total stop of the contagion u = 1 can only be achieved with strict isolation and hence
an almost total loss in production. This in turn would translate in loss of life, so we feel
justified in keeping W the yearly production as the accounting unit without expressing
it in terms of fatalities imputed to economic hardship. This means that the value of A
should roughly correspond to the value of total loss of production and in utility terms
should be greater than one. An alternative way to select A with a quadratic cost is to
estimate a level of intervention whose cost is numerically equal to its effectiveness that
is Au2o = uo and A = u
−1
o . Then for u ≤ uo the cost is below the effectiveness of the
intervention and conversely for higher values. For instance, if we have cheap intervention
only for contagion reductions smaller than 10% (a situation where intervention is difficult)
this implies a high value of A = 10. We will examine scenaria with various values for A,
even lower than unity.
The arrival of a successful cure and/or a vaccine is considered a random variable with
known density. We mainly used a uniform distribution in [1, 2] reflecting the widespread
belief that a vaccine will be available in 18 months. This probability is considered negative
exponential in [1] but this is not consistent with the prevailing view that it is not likely
to find such a cure in at least a year.
4 Types of Optimal Intervention
We have calculated the optimal policies for several parameter sets we refer to as Scenaria.
These policies are presented mostly diagrammatically. We show in the Figures for each
policy the trajectory of the susceptibles and the control, both being in the unit interval.
We also show the trajectory of the infectives fraction scaled by the capacity level vo(t) so
most of the time v(t)/vo(t) is in [0, 1].
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Table 2: Scenaria parameters and results
Scen- Bound on Interven- Infec- Rein- Sce- Initial Initial Final Final
ario Infected tion Cost tives fection nario φs φv φs φv
No. vo A Cost m Rate δ Cost
1 1.00 0.5 5 0.0 0.243 0.254 0.213 0.008 1.081
2 1.00 0.5 5 0.3 0.252 0.243 0.416 0.014 0.000
3 0.05 2.0 5 0.0 1.165 0.598 25.63 0317 -1.302
4 0.05 20.0 5 0.0 4.531 5.159 120.14 1.992 1384.5
5 0.10 2.00 2.5 0.0 0.411 0.478 10.71 4.604 -1.4·108
For reasonable variation in parameters we generate optimal policies that correspond to
those that have been implemented by the countries inflicted by the virus, the moral being
that any of the policies actually followed is reasonable for a specific parameter selection.
The particular parameters we have used in the scenaria are shown in Table 2, where we
have indicated by boldface entries differing from those in the previous row. In each row
we show for the corresponding scenario health system capacity, cost of intervention, cost
of infection per time unit, and other relevant parameters. In the second part of the table
we show some computational results, namely total cost of the scenario, the initial and
final values of the costate variables. We omitted the final values of the state variables
since these are shown in the corresponding diagrams. In all scenaria the initial values
are v(0) = 0.1% of the population being infected, s(0) = 98% susceptible, the rest being
immune. The penalty exponential in (4) has a coefficient of M = 200 and unit multiplier
a. Other parameters that are common in all scenaria are: Contact rate λo = 70 year
−1,
Recovery rate γ = 20 year−1, Discount rate ρ = 3%, Seasonality kseas = 80%. A perfect
cure will occur in a random time uniformly distributed between one and two years, this
being the most widely expressed experts’ estimate. Variation in these parameters will be
shown in the appropriate scenaria.
We first examine a situation of a high capacity health system for which there is no
bound on the infected fraction, and zero reinfection. The intervention cost is low with a
value of A = 0.5, i.e. vanishing of the contact rate can be achieved with a production
loss of 50%. This is Scenario 1 in the Table, and the corresponding Figure 1. Note that
the final costate variable in the Table is somewhat large (about unity) so we applied the
gradient method to improve on the policy: this did not significantly alter it, giving a cost
improvement of just 10−6 confirming the results in the Table. In this policy it is optimal
to impose light measures and essentially let the infection take its course. The maximum
infected will be in three months and the total population will be in the removed state by
then. The total cost is calculated at 0.243 which was expected: The total time spent by
the infectives in this state is 1/20 years, at cost 5, so the total cost for the susceptibles
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(98% of the population) is 5 · 0.98/20 = 0.245 which is slightly larger than the optimal
cost of 0.243. Note also that the infectives’ fraction will always be below 50%.
We assume now that there is a loss of immunity with 30% of these removed becoming
susceptible in one year. Thus in Scenario 2, Figure 2 we have an optimal policy consisting
of slightly more intense measures and almost the same cost 0.252, but a strongly rising
population of susceptibles until the horizon end at year 2. At t = 0.25 almost the entire
population becomes infected, with a serious danger of social disruption that has not been
included in our costs. For t ≥ 0.25 susceptibles are mostly below γ/λ = 20/70 u 0.29
which is required for the infectives’ fraction to decrease.
Figure 1: High capacity system, Small intervention cost, no reinfection
Figure 2: High capacity system, Small intervention cost, Reinfection
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We next consider health systems that will be stressed by a high level of infectives. In
line with the parameter selection of Section 3 we consider a maximum of infectives vo to be
either 5 or 10 percent. We include the possibility of expanding the health system without
extra cost, so we consider either a constant vo or of the form vo(t) = vo2
t, a characteristic
that will be shown to have little effect on policy since the increase arrives too late. In
Scenario 3 we consider a barely adequate health system with infectives capacity vo = 5%,
a reasonable intervention cost of A = 2 and no capacity expansion. The optimal policy
consists of implementing strong measures to keep infection fraction to acceptable levels,
see Figure 3 (again we exhibit v/vo instead of v). This is a strict suppression policy
where infectives remain low and susceptibles high throughout the period, and thus requires
reimposing measures in the next autumn. Intervention permanently ceases after t u 1.5
in the expectation of the arrival of the vaccine. As a result infectives start increasing
and reach the capacity level before starting to drop due to the seasonal reduction in the
contact rate. They start to rise again at t u 1.75 but fail to exceed capacity by the
end of the horizon. The cost of this Scenario is almost five times that of the Scenaria 1
and 2 (1.17 versus only 0.25), and this was to be expected given the higher control cost
and the inferior health system. Computationally, although the final costate variable are
reasonably close to zero, applying the gradient method gives a similar policy with 3%
lower cost, so we decided to keep the result in the table. A similar policy is optimal even
in the case of reinfections (not shown), which is to be expected as susceptibles stay high
anyway. A capacity doubling also yields a similar policy, the infected being now a lower
fraction of capacity. Increasing the arrival horizon of the vaccine by assuming a uniform
distribution in [1,3] also calls for intensive measures keeping the infected population low
and stopping close to the horizon’s end. We wrongly conjectured that a herd of immunity
policy would have been better; this might be true for a longer horizon.
Increasing the cost of intervention significantly (A = 20) alters the character of the
optimal policy - this is Scenario 4 in the Table and Figure 4. The measures are strict in
the beginning but are soon interrupted at t u 0.5. The infected exceed the upper bound
by 20%, so the solution is not strictly acceptable but the results are instructive. The
measures do not repeat in the following year so the infectives rise, but given the smaller
susceptible fraction of s u 0.4 they do not exceed the bound vo, while the susceptibles
decrease further. This is consistent with what is popularly referred as flattening the
curve strategy, allowing sufficient immunity to be attained at a rate that does not
exceed the capacity of the health system. The optimal policy for a longer horizon has
a similar structure. From the numerical point of view, given the large values of the
final costate values, it is possible to further decrease the cost by the gradient method.
This improvement is again small (about 4%) with a similar policy, so we kept the original
results. We do not have an intuitive justification of the bump in the control policy towards
11
Figure 3: Low capacity system, Medium intervention cost, No Reinfection
the end of the horizon, in contrast with that of Scenario 3 where measures cease as the
arrival of the vaccine approaches.
Figure 4: Low capacity system, High intervention cost, No Reinfection - Flattening
the Curve Policy
A policy that also is of the flattening the curve - type occurs for a medium cost of
intervention (A = 2), moderately prepared health system (the fraction of infected vo can
be up to 10%) while the cost of infection is also moderate reflecting optimistic assessments
of the virulence (m=2.5). This is Scenario 5 in Table 2, and the optimal response is shown
in Figure 5. Again the final values of the costates are high, so we applied the gradient
method, which again gave insignificant improvements (less than 1%, a cost of 0.409 instead
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of 0.411 shown in the Table), so we kept the calculations in the Table. The optimal policy
again consists of a strong intervention during the winter (from t = 0, the autumn equinox
to t = 0.5 the spring equinox) peaking at u = .8 and stopping not to be repeated. The
infected population slightly exceeds capacity but then decreases, shows a second peak
right after the end of the measures and then vanishes under the combined effect of the
seasonal drop in the contact rate and the reduction in susceptibles to about 15% (which is
lower than the level guaranteeing the eradication of the infection 20/(1.8 ∗ 70) = 15.9%).
This policy is optimal even for smaller intervention costs but at a very low cost (A = 1)
it is optimal to implement a strict intervention as in Scenario 3. We also examined the
effect of reinfection, and it proved to have a minor effect: if in Scenario 5 we assume that
30% of those recovered lose their immunity in one year the optimal policy changes only
slightly.
Figure 5: Medium capacity system, Medium intervention cost, No Reinfection -
Flattening the Curve Policy
We ran several variations of the above scenaria, altering the discount rate and the
seasonality parameter. The policies generated did not substantially differ from the ones
already presented.
As of the time of writing, measures are being substantially relaxed throughout Europe.
This can be considered as a tacit acceptance of either a strong seasonality in the contact
rate, or a reassessment of the cost of intervention. Furthermore, estimates of the acquired
immunity in most countries are well below 30% of the population. This seems to indicate
that a type of Scenario 3 policy is being followed, and hence (as has been stated by
spokespersons of the public health authorities) we should expect some sort of repetition
of the interventions towards the end of the year. Given the experience acquired by public
health authorities we expect more effective interventions - a feature that can also be
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incorporated in a model that includes learning by doing.
5 Model extensions, conclusions
The model could be enhanced in several directions:
• Introduce more population classes, for instance age groups, symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic infectives as done in [5]
• Consider spatially distributed models, leading to diffusion partial differential equa-
tions which have a similar optimal control treatment
• The states s, v have to be estimated in any stochastic SIR type model. A Kalman
filtering approach on a linearization of the SIR equations with imperfect observation
and noise could be easily implemented, complementing the ubiquitous data analysis
methods that have been proposed.
• Investigate the characteristics of an optimal policy for variable underlying contact
rates, using techniques as in [9]
References
[1] Fernando E Alvarez, David Argente, and Francesco Lippi. A simple planning prob-
lem for COVID-19 lockdown. Working Paper 26981, National Bureau of Economic
Research, April 2020.
[2] Jeffrey K Aronson, Jon Brassey, and Kamal R. Mahtani. When will
it be over?: An introduction to viral reproduction numbers, Ro and
Re. https://www.cebm.net/covid-19/when-will-it-be-over-an-introduction-to-viral-
reproduction-numbers-r0-and-re/, 19 April 2020. Centre for Evidence-Based
Medicine, Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, University of Ox-
ford.
[3] Eran Bendavid, Bianca Mulaney, Neeraj Sood, Soleil Shah, Emilia Ling, Re-
becca Bromley-Dulfano, Cara Lai, Zoe Weissberg, Rodrigo Saavedra-Walker, James
Tedrow, Dona Tversky, Andrew Bogan, Thomas Kupiec, Daniel Eichner, Ribhav
Gupta, John Ioannidis, and Jay Bhattacharya. Covid-19 antibody seroprevalence
in Santa Clara County, California. medRxiv, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press,
2020.
[4] Arthur Bryson and Yu-Chi Ho. Applied Optimal Control. Ginn and Company, 1969.
14
[5] Arthur Charpentier, Romuald Elie, Mathieu Lauriere, and Viet Chi Tran. COVID-19
pandemic control: Balancing detection policy and lockdown intervention under ICU
sustainability. arXiv:2005.06526v3 [q-bio.PE], May 13 2020.
[6] Samuel Daniel Conte and Carl W. De Boor. Elementary Numerical Analysis: An
Algorithmic Approach. McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 3rd edition, 1980.
[7] Neil M Ferguson, Daniel Laydon, and Gemma Nedjati-Gilani et al. Impact of non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19 mortality and healthcare
demand. https://doi.org/10.25561/77482, March 20, 2020. Imperial College London.
[8] W.O. Kermack and A. G. McKendrick. A contribution to the mathematical theory
of epidemics. Proc. Roy. Soc., A115:700–721, 1927.
[9] Thomas Kruse and Philipp Strack. Optimal control of an epidemic through social
distancing. Discussion Paper 2229, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics,
Yale University.
[10] Facundo Piguillem and Liyan Shi. Optimal COVID-19 quarantine and testing poli-
cies. EIEF Working Papers Series 2004, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
(EIEF), 2020.
[11] Hethcote. H. W. The mathematics of infectious diseases. SIAM Review, 42:599–653,
2000.
15
